

PREPARED STATEMENT

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“TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A POST SUMMIT ASSESSMENT”

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wexler, Members of the Subcommittee on Europe,

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the state of transatlantic relations after the various summit meetings held this past month. As was the case in previous instances, appearing before you is a privilege. In this particular case, however, let me first state, Mr. Chairman, that your decision to not run for election in November 2004 is cause for much regret in and beyond the think tank communities on both sides of the Atlantic. Your leadership will be missed.

Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment for the states of Europe and their Union (EU), as well as for the Atlantic alliance and its Organization (NATO). Over a six-week period this spring, the historic enlargements of NATO and the EU, together with the moving celebration of the landings in Normandy, served as reminders of how far we have come over the past 60 years. Then, over a three-week period in June, the EU Summit in Brussels, the G-8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the U.S.-EU Summit in Shannon, Ireland, and the NATO Summit in Istanbul reminded us of how far we still have to go over the next 60 months. As shall be seen, each of these Summits produced significant decisions. How, how well, and how expeditiously these decisions are enforced—and with or without whom—will leave NATO, the European Union, and the transatlantic partnership either much more cohesive and thus stronger, or more divided and therefore weaker.

Indeed, the upcoming five-year period is comparable to another such moment, in 1948-1953 when, following a hard-fought presidential election, an institutional architecture was put in place that defined a Western strategy for facing the new security conditions that had been emerging during the previous three years. Now, too, we fear a new security normalcy, inaugurated by horrific events nearly three years ago, and a comprehensive Western strategy is needed to defeat it.

This will not be easy. To help, of course, we have the institutions inherited from the Cold War. Yet much work remains to be done to complete the EU, adapt NATO, and renew our partnership. On all three accounts, each of last month's summits produced warm embraces and communiqués, but none can yet permit one to conclude that the Atlantic Crisis of 2003 is behind us at last. That such would be the case is not surprising. The crisis was neither bilateral—not even between the United States and France, our most outspoken critic in Europe. Nor was the crisis personal—not even over Europe's disturbing, and probably irreversible, mistrust of President George W. Bush and parts of his administration. Rather, the crisis of 2003 was, and remains a structural crisis resulting from Europe's unfinished transformation and America's preponderant power in the face of the new security challenges inherited from the end of the Cold War and the horrific events of September 11, 2001.

Before reviewing the post-Summit condition of intra-European and trans-Atlantic relations let me start on an explicitly positive note. In recent years, there has been much pessimism about Europe and our alliance with the states of Europe and their Union. Much of that pessimism has grown out of, or has led to, an unbalanced analysis that either exaggerated Europe's weakness while overstating the scope and superiority of American power or, conversely, overstated Europe's potential as an adversarial counterweight of an America supposedly unable to meet the imperial tests of efficacy and hence durability. A more balanced and less dogmatic analysis should begin with the recognition of the remarkable developments that have taken place in Europe and between Europe and the United States not only since World War II or the end of the Cold War, but also since 2001 and even over the past 15 months.

- ♦ As a Euro-Atlantic community of increasingly compatible values, the West has continued to expand its membership—up to 26 for NATO and 25 for the EU. Now, the Euro-Atlantic space comprises 32 countries, including 19 European countries that belong to both Western institutions. This is not the end of enlargement for either institution, however. Among the countries that are awaiting membership, Turkey for the EU and Ukraine for NATO are especially important. Elections scheduled for Ukraine next fall may prove decisive, and NATO should be prepared to respond to signs of a maturing democracy in this important country after they are confirmed later this year. As to Turkey, genuine democratic reforms are making its membership in the EU “irreversible”—in President Chirac’s word—and the start of negotiations will hopefully be announced at the next European Council summit in December 2004, when decisions for Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia—expected for 2007—are awaited as well.
- ♦ As a Euro-Atlantic community of converging interests, the West has also deepened during this difficult period. Antiwar sentiments in Europe and occasional bursts of Euro-phobic reactions in the United States have not prevented a sharp increase in investment flows across the Atlantic. Our economic space is truly integrated. Areas of tensions remain, to be sure, on matters of trade, regulation, competition, money, and much more—but these tensions are limited to a miniscule percentage of the totality of our commercial transactions that add up into an ever-closer transatlantic market place that can itself reach finality by the middle of the next decade. We care about Europe, and Europe cares about us, like two people do after a 50-odd year marriage: with the recognition we have become alike, however difficult it may be for some to accept it; with the knowledge that we have become one, because of the impossibility to separate our respective assets; and with the belief that divorce is not a viable option because however difficult life may be with each other it would be worse if lived with someone else.
- ♦ As an emerging Euro-Atlantic community of action, the West has been able to achieve cohesion in various areas essential to our ability to fulfill the many goals we share in the world generally and in the war against terrorism specifically. While the coalition of the willing now in Iraq is not as large as we would have liked it to be, we were nonetheless able to achieve a universal consensus at the UN twice in 30 months, first in November 2002 and next in June 2004. While the agreement to give NATO a more significant role in Iraq did not go as far as we had hoped, and even as several NATO members remain unequivocally hostile to deploying their national forces there, NATO is engaged in Afghanistan and its members are playing a critical role on many other fronts of the global wars against terror, or in some of the conflicts that developed after the Cold War, in Bosnia, Macedonia, and elsewhere. Equally noticeable in recent years is the sharp improvement in intelligence cooperation within the EU and with the United States, the coordinated use of non-military tools for the defeat of terrorist groups and organizations, and much more, including U.S.-EU and EU-NATO security relations.

- ♦ And finally, as a uniquely intimate partnership whose members share a strategic vision of world order among them more than with any other group of states, NATO and the EU are making compatible sounds on most global issues. That, to be sure, is still short of a common, let alone single, voice: the war we in the United States have been waging since September 11, 2001, is still not felt with the same urgency in Europe. But especially since the tragic incidents of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, Europe is slowly coming to grips with a reality it can no longer easily deny. As Irving Kristol once put it, a neo-conservative is a liberal who's been mugged by reality: however tragic the mugging of March 11 in Spain, the post-9/11 reality is catching up with Europe, and as a result Europe may be catching up with America.

Although banal, my initial conclusion, Mr. Chairman, deserves to be repeated. While the end of the Cold War and the advent of the war against global terrorism changed many things, neither changed the centrality of our relations with Europe. Admittedly, the Old World no longer has the same geopolitical significance as it did in the past, either as a collection of world powers or as the primary stake of a struggle between two extra-European superpowers. Yet whatever geopolitical significance it may have lost, Europe has gained in all other areas as a producer of relevant power and influence. We are each other's partners of choice for peace, for stability, for progress, and for prosperity—not just among us, because on the whole these goals have been met in the West, but on behalf of other parts of the world that still lag behind in all these areas. Notwithstanding a few moments and words of tensions, the broad terms of this partnership were reasserted in the summits held this past month. There is, in short, a genuinely pro-American world out there, in Europe, and this provides us with the window of opportunity needed to renew our relations because there is nothing out there in the world that cannot be done more effectively and more expeditiously together rather than separately.

Completing the Union?

As explained in a previous testimony for this subcommittee, the transformation of Europe, from a fragmented mosaic of nation-states into a peaceful union of member-states, stands as the most significant geopolitical development of the second half of the 20th century. That is cause for legitimate satisfaction. To an extent, the idea of Europe is an American idea not only because a few hundred million Europeans are repeating in the Old World what a few hundred thousand of them began in the New World two hundred years earlier, but also because it is the postwar commitment of U.S. power and leadership that gave the states of Europe the means and the security they needed to engage into the bold and even extravagant process of integration that is now nearing finality.

The most recent EU Summit four weeks ago was a historic success, and credit must go to the Irish presidency that was ready to move full speed when opportunities for agreement began to appear in mid-March—agreement on enlargement, a constitutional treaty, reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the selection of a new President for the Commission. Yet, satisfaction over what was achieved at this Summit is tempered by some apprehension over the obstacles that still stand in the way of what remains to be done.

For more than four decades, Europe's integration has depended on three main conditions that influenced the scope, pace, and effectiveness of each new initiative embraced by these treaties:

- ♦ Robust, sustained, and widely shared economic growth, with benefits for the most recent members or the more needy small economies;
- ♦ Stable and confident centrist national leadership able to resist pressures from either political extreme; and

- ♦ Regional stability, in the East but also, and especially since September 11, in the South across the Mediterranean.

In the midst or on the eve of finality these features are lacking, and the EU will be facing difficult challenges as it prepares for its blind date with history, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties.

- ♦ Growth is weak, and prospects for future growth remain unsatisfactory. The Lisbon agenda for social and economic renewal is stalled, and the June EU summit did little to re-launch it—a task now assumed by the Dutch presidency that began on July 1. In part as a result of Europe's inability to produce more affluence to justify the increasing pains of membership, there seems to be a growing public unease with the EU and its institutions. Public participation at the June elections for a new European Parliament was historically low—even among the new EU members (17 percent in Slovakia, 20 percent in Poland, and 28 percent in the Czech Republic).
- ♦ Political leaders, including but not limited to those who followed the U.S. lead in Iraq, are at the mercy of their electoral calendar, as shown by the recent national elections in Greece and Spain, and regional elections in Germany, France and Italy. For the European elections, the largest government party of all EU members except Greece and Spain suffered serious setbacks. In Poland, Britain and Germany in 2005, Italy in 2006, and up to France in May 2007, existing governing majorities are all at risk. Over the past 18 months, the pattern has been clear: strong governments that joined the coalition of the willing have weakened (in Spain, Great Britain, Poland, and Italy) while weak governments that opposed the coalition have become weaker (including France and Germany).
- ♦ Few political leaders, experts, and analysts are prepared to rule out one or more additional acts of terror in Europe before the end of the year. Europe's vulnerability is a matter of geographic proximity, economic dependence, and cultural sensitivity. Soft targets abound. Instabilities in the Greater Middle East would quickly spill over to the continent, whatever their form—whether out of the Persian Gulf, because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or, least mentioned but hardly least likely, through disruptions in Saudi Arabia. Because of their economic and political consequences, instabilities exported from this region would impact the EU agenda—as happened after the first oil crisis and related Middle East War in 1973. Because of the presence of large communities of Muslim citizens, such instabilities could also spill over into the streets of the main European capitals.

Four issues will be especially contentious during the coming two to three years. These will serve as benchmarks for how and how well the EU can be expected to perform during the next several years:

- ♦ The two-year ratification debates for the EU constitutional treaty, which will be signed in October 2004. Approval by all members is needed, but with several members committed to a public referendum, including Great Britain, what would occur if one or more states were to reject the treaty is not clear. Indeed, some EU states now seem to argue that approval by at least four-fifths of the current 25 members could be deemed sufficient, thus launching a so-called two-speed Europe of ill-defined content and direction.
- ♦ The re-negotiation of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is a pre-condition for the completion of the euro zone. Europe is hardly near the write-off that is often claimed—with serious corporate restructuring and profitability gains, and Germany seemingly standing at the beginning of a cyclical upturn. But the benefits of the single currency are

still lacking behind as the three EU members that opted out when the euro was launched continue to postpone participation.

- ♦ The performance of the new EU members, including Poland, where there is already some public resentment over the one-sided negotiations of the past few years. In this context, the negotiation of a new EU budget for the years 2007-2013 is also an important benchmark, and a source of significant debate among and within the members.
- ♦ New decisions for further enlargement, including especially Turkey (whose membership is unlikely to occur before 2013 even if negotiations were to start in 2005), not to mention the membership of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, now scheduled for 2007, and possibly some Balkan states in 2010. Such discussions, it should be noted, could have serious negative consequences on the upcoming constitutional debates.

Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues know well the importance of the EU to a strong transatlantic partnership. History teaches that the United States most suffers from conditions in Europe when some European states start something they cannot complete—a war or a revolution in the past, and now a currency or a union. Yet even as the need for more Europe remains stronger than ever before, the public taste for Europe also seems to be turning increasingly sour and resentful.

Power and Weaknesses

Throughout the Cold War, Europe's inability to produce more military power of its own was cause for exasperation. After the Cold War, initial hopes that Europe's time had finally come in Bosnia were quickly deflated. Since September 2001, it has become painfully clear that only a Euro-Atlantic partnership that relies on a better military balance can escape a condition of "power and weakness" that makes Europe look mostly like a dead weight relative to an America whose preponderance makes it look like an imperial bully. Achieving such balance does not require America to become weaker; rather it demands that Europe itself acquire more of the military strength it lacks.

There is no need for subtlety here. With the main exceptions of France and the UK, most EU members of NATO do not spend enough on defense: 2 percent of GNP should be a minimum, and 14 European members of NATO do not meet that minimum. To make matters worse, much of that spending is on personnel—about 60 percent—and little is left for procurement, leaving an estimated 80,000 troops out of a reported 1.2 to 1.5 million non-U.S. NATO troops in uniform readily available for deployment. Spending more and spending better is overdue—an obligation neglected for too long and now too deep to be neglected any longer. To argue that the accounting of defense spending should include spending on alleged "soft power" is intellectually creative but it remains an alibi for continuing to do less than what is needed under current security conditions.

This condition creates a contradiction that is a significant source of current transatlantic tensions. As an unfinished union of states, Europe now stands as a power in the world, which gives it a legitimate voice that America must hear more and more clearly than has been the case to-date, especially by this administration; but lacking the capabilities required for military action when necessary, it is not, or not yet, the world power that it claims to be, and the price of consultation is not always worth the benefits it brings.

As a power in the world, the countries of Europe and their Union show:

- ♦ Interests that are global in scope and vital in significance as the EU expands its spheres of influence and values into and beyond the realm of its members' former empires;

- ♦ Capabilities that have become competitive in most dimensions of power except for military force. These include preventive security tools like commercial policy, economic aid, and public diplomacy. In recent years and months, the EU states and the Union have also made significant progress in developing their defensive tools of homeland security like law enforcement measures, border and aviation security, first steps for the physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructures, and more;
- ♦ A saliency that is truly universal because of a reputation in the world gained by its nation-states during their long history, for the better and for the worse, but renewed through its institutions, mostly for the better, over the past 50 years.

The next few years will show whether Europe and its Union are willing and able to also gain the military power, as well as the will to use it, without which they would remain unable to move up to the next level—as a power in the world that would also stand as a world power—or, as Tony Blair put it, a superpower but not a super state. The reference to Tony Blair is not fortuitous: the key to Europe's ability to develop an effective foreign, security, and defense policy is indeed the participation of the UK, a participation that is even more indispensable politically, at least in the short term, than Germany's military contributions may prove to be in the long term. The time is long gone, when Britain could stay out of Europe, and Europe away from Britain.

When dealing with security issues and, more specifically, Europe's contributions to the management of these issues, the Sea Island and Istanbul summits were frankly disappointing. The states that objected to joining the U.S.-sponsored coalition of the willing in Iraq in the spring of 2003 continued to object to renewed UN-endorsed efforts to end the occupation on behalf of a rehabilitated Iraqi state that explicitly asked for NATO support and clearly needs additional EU help. Further contributions on the other fronts of the war against terrorism, especially in Afghanistan where additional troops are needed, were also postponed. And while there was recognition that threatening instabilities in the Greater Middle East cannot be ignored much longer, little was agreed in practice—notwithstanding seven separate communiqués released after the U.S.-EU Summit held immediately before the NATO summit. What emerged out of Istanbul and Sea Island was a minimum consensus that fell far short of legitimate expectations: agree to not disagree by agreeing to agree at a later date. In so doing, each head of state or government was able to go home claiming that he had been convincing and, most of all, firm or cooperative depending on his specific political needs.

Mr. Chairman, this persistent debate over modalities when faced with a complex set of urgent issues—Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, but also Iran —is troubling. Whether Iraq was a war of choice or a war of necessity can be argued on moral as well as security grounds; but ending the war responds to both a moral and a security imperative that cannot be ignored. Failure in Iraq is not an option, because of consequences that are unthinkable and thus unpredictable. By some definitions of failure, it may already have occurred as many of the reasons used earlier to explain the need for war have proven to be misleading, while most of the goals asserted to present it as a just war have not been fulfilled yet. Mistakes were made on all sides. Prior to the war, we overplayed a strong military hand, and some in Europe overplayed a weak diplomatic hand. After the collapse of public diplomacy in early 2003, the conduct of the war proper was impressive. In the spring, Saddam's removal made Iraq freer but whether it also made us safer can be debated—and most Europeans fear otherwise. In the fall, it became clear that planning for postwar Iraq had been grossly insufficient to say the least. This is not the time to engage into any sort of blame game, however, whether at home, in the coalition, or within the alliance at large. The administration's change of course over the past 10 to 12 weeks confirms that the coalition has not been up to the current missions of liberation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation. To be effectively assumed, these missions demand a fuller involvement of NATO, the EU and their respective members on top of the global legitimacy provided by the UN.

- ♦ With occupation ended, completing Iraq's liberation from foreign and local forces that promote terror and deepen insecurity requires more foreign ground forces, pending the organization of viable Iraqi military and police forces preferably trained by NATO in Iraq. This is not the moment to set a date certain for the withdrawal of coalition forces now deployed in Iraq.
- ♦ With an Iraqi government now leading a period of transition from partial to complete sovereignty, rehabilitating the Iraqi state demands a direct UN role in organizing credible national elections no later than January 2005.
- ♦ Notwithstanding the fact that full security will remain out of reach for some time to come, Iraq's reconstruction needs to proceed under direct control of the new Iraqi government, and with the full support of all allies, whatever their disposition at the start of the war.

The June summits addressed many of these issues, but none was conclusive. Even as Chancellor Schroeder praised the "remarkable change in the American foreign policy" shown at Sea Island, or President Chirac found in Istanbul "much, much more openness" than "at any time in the past," both men remained reluctant to respond in kind at this time. The temptation to postpone final decision may grow out of a desire to await the outcome of the next U.S. presidential election. That would be, of course, unfortunate. Because there is some urgency in attending to the issues currently on the Euro-Atlantic agenda, this attitude may even be irresponsible.

In Iraq, the allies' reluctance to increase their contributions at this time was predictable, despite the fact that much of what had been requested by our critics had actually been met. Indeed, prospects for 2005 are for a smaller rather than a larger coalition as some of its "willing" members are preparing for a withdrawal of some of their forces currently deployed in Iraq. But what about Afghanistan, where unlike Iraq the consensus for war was global and UN legitimacy beyond question? In this case, too, the June summits produced general agreements that fell short of specific actions.

NATO currently has 5 million military personnel overall—active and reserve, from all of its services, apart from U.S. contributions. Non-U.S. NATO equipment is reported to include 13,000 tanks, 35,000 armored infantry vehicles, and 11,000 aircrafts. NATO countries outside the United States now spend close to \$200 billions dollars every year on their military. Yet, in spite of President Hamid Karzai's plea "to please hurry, as NATO in Afghanistan ... today and not tomorrow," the European members of NATO have not mustered the 3,500 to 4,000 troops needed to ensure adequate security for parliamentary elections this fall. That, Mr. Chairman, is disappointing and post-Summit negotiations within NATO will hopefully make it possible to respond to Mr. Karzai's request, so that the presidential election at least can be held in October with a modicum of security.

Completing this "iron triangle" of short-term issues is Iran, which did not figure at the center of these summits. Yet the significance of Iran in coming months and years should not be neglected. Iran is a test of Europe's interest in, commitment to, and capacity for leadership. France, Germany, and Great Britain wanted to lead and launched an initiative designed to address issues of concern with regard to Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction. The EU followed soon afterward. The United States quickly approved, notwithstanding some concerns that were stated at the time. Now, there is a need for Europe to deliver on its initiative, including the imposition and enforcement of sanctions if the Iranian government does not follow up on the commitments it made to the EU powers. This is a test that the EU must pass, just as Afghanistan is a challenge NATO must meet, and Iraq is a test America cannot fail.

A New Consensus

That one or more summits could not fully resolve the structural dimensions of the Atlantic crisis of 2003 is not surprising. That will take time—a time likely to last the term of the next U.S. administration if not longer. An institutional road map for the structural renewal of the Western alliance includes:

- ♦ The states of Europe and their Union need to assume a larger role commensurate with their current capabilities, interests, and influence. They also need to move on with their efforts to upgrade their military capabilities and achieve the cohesion they need to play that role. The goal is not to build an adversarial counterweight but to gain the weight needed to be an active counterpart of the United States with and within NATO. This broad conclusion could certainly be inferred from the U.S.-EU summit, as well as from the EU summit that preceded it and the NATO summit that followed.
- ♦ A NATO that has gone global must be ready and able to act locally if it is to remain the security institution of choice for all of its members. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, it is still in business, but what that business actually consists of is not as clear as it must be. The European members of NATO must provide the Organization with the additional capabilities it needs to face the new global mandate linked to the events of September 11, 2001 and March 11, 2004. This conclusion could credibly be inferred from the Istanbul summit that confirmed the goals that had been set at Prague in November 2003.
- ♦ A strategic dialogue is needed to develop a comprehensive approach to the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security agenda aimed at the development of policies that need not be common in each instance but must remain complementary in all instances. While such a dialogue will have to await the U.S. presidential election of November 2004, it should start at the earliest possible time after that. For such a dialogue to be sustained over time, the next administration will have to be committed to sending the best available group of U.S. ambassadors to represent the country in the main European capitals. The failure in public diplomacy in recent years had much to do with a neglect of the skills and experience needed to assume such important assignments—including linguistic skills and relevant background.
- ♦ The G-8 summit especially gave particular attention to the Greater Middle East, a central part of the Euro-Atlantic strategic dialogue needed for the coming decades. Like Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, the significance of this region, coupled with its volatility, makes it the defining geopolitical challenge of our time. There cannot be any sort of global order if there is no order within that region. For such an order to emerge, American power—however indispensable it may be—will not prove sufficient unless it can rely on Europe's power which—however necessary it is—is not sufficient either. That is the challenge that must now be addressed with the same bold spirit, the same compelling compassion, and the same common purpose as was shown when the transformation of Europe began 50 years ago, as a revolt against a failed past. We are now at this point: Americans and Europeans alike, as well as those who live in that region, have failed to generate the conditions that would make it possible to live up to its potential within a peaceful, democratic, affluent, and stable environment. A Euro-Atlantic initiative for the Middle East includes a commitment to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but it need not await its final outcome to get started. As learned in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, reconciliation follows pacification and reconstruction, and not the other way around.

Along the road, there are many goals we need to pursue if we are to achieve the comprehensive Euro-Atlantic strategy of global complementarity we need for the wars of 911. These include:

- ♦ Complementarity of European membership in NATO and the EU, meaning that all European members of NATO should ultimately be members of the EU, including Turkey but also Norway, and all EU members should be NATO members as well, including Austria but also Sweden, Finland, and others.
- ♦ Complementarity of NATO and EU relations with countries that are not members of either institution, meaning especially a more effective coordination of U.S. and European policies toward Russia—a Euro-Atlantic Ostpolitik. Territorial oddities like Kaliningrad, and institutional orphans in Europe, like Ukraine, also demand more policy coordination by the United States and Europe, as do other countries that are not part of the Euro-Atlantic geographic area but are nonetheless seeking partnerships for peace and prosperity in its context—like the countries of North Africa.
- ♦ Closer U.S.-EU relations, as Europe's recognition of its special partnership with the United States—a non-member member state of the EU—but also as a U.S. acknowledgement of the EU and its members as a vital, though unfinished, partner. The historic enlargements of both the EU and NATO, the naming of a new European Commission, and a new or renewed U.S. administration open the door for a New Deal in U.S.-EU-NATO relations. If re-elected, President Bush should meet his European counterparts—heads of state and government of all current EU and NATO members—in Europe, possibly on the eve of the next EU Summit in December 2004. In case of the opposite result, President-elect John Kerry should immediately name a special envoy to Europe for consultation in anticipation of an official visit to the main European capitals in February 2005.
- ♦ Better coordination between NATO and the EU as two institutions whose parallel contributions to the war against global terror are indispensable if those wars are going to be both won and ended. The future of a European security pillar is tied to NATO, and NATO's future is dependent on its ability to act globally—on the basis of capabilities enhanced by a better coordination of non-military security tools between the allies, and a common understanding of the priorities they share on the basis of a more compatible strategic view of the world they face.

This, Mr. Chairman, is not a small agenda. But it is not a new vision either—for it is no more than the extension of the vision that was launched after World War II in the name of the Cold War, and now needs completion after the Cold War and in the name of the wars of September 11—all wars that America did not start but which it did wage, win, and ultimately end.

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Dr. Serfaty is the author of a large number of books. Most recent among them are *La tentation impériale* (2004), *Memories of Europe's Future: Farewell to Yesteryear* (1999), *Stay the Course* (1997), and *Taking Europe Seriously* (1992). Forthcoming is *Power and Order: The Imperial Temptation and its European Dimension* (2004). Books edited by Dr. Serfaty include, most recently, *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq and Transatlantic Relations* (2004), *The European Finality Debate and its National Dimensions* (2003) and, among others, *The Media and Foreign Policy* (1990).

Dr. Serfaty's articles have appeared in most leading professional journals in the United States and Europe, and he has been a guest lecturer in over 40 different countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia. A naturalized U.S. citizen since 1965, Dr. Serfaty holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.